In regular digital signatures, once the secret key is compromised, all signatures, even those that were issued by the honest signer before the compromise, will not be trustworthy any more. Forward-secure signatures have been proposed to address this major shortcoming.
Introduction

Prior work
The notion of forward-secure signatures was introduced in 1997 by Anderson [And97] to remove a serious limitation of regular digital signatures: once the secret key is lost (or stolen), all documents previously signed with that key become invalid. To reduce the damage, Anderson proposed to divide the validity time of a key pair into time periods. At the end of each time period, the signer derives the new secret key from the current one in a one-way fashion, and then securely erases the no-longerneeded current secret key. The public key, in contrast, remains unchanged during the life span of the key pair. This general approach ensures validity of all documents signed prior to the time period of compromise.
In recent years several forward-secure schemes were developed. Bellare and Miner [BM99] gave the formal definition of forward-secure signatures by extending the security definition for ordinary signatures of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [GMR88] . They also proposed two schemes: one based on a tree-like structure of certificates using any ordinary signature scheme, and the other based on modifying the Fiat-Shamir [FS86] ordinary signature scheme. Following this work, many other forward-secure signature schemes were developed. The development has followed two paths: one was based on modifying specific, Fiat-Shamir-like, signature schemes, while the other used any ordinary signature scheme as a black box. Our scheme belongs to the first category, in which two other schemes (in addition to the one of [BM99] ) are known. Abdalla's and Reyzin's scheme [AR00] is based on modifying Ong-Schnorr signatures [OS90] , and shortens the secret and public keys of the Fiat-Shamir-based scheme of [BM99] (at the expense of Signing and Verifying time). Itkis' and Reyzin's scheme [IR01] is based on modifying Guillou-Quisquater [GQ88] signatures, and results in both short keys and efficient Signing and Verifying. We summarize the relevant performance attributes of these schemes in Table 1 .
We note that forward-secure signature schemes in the second category (the ones using any ordinary signature scheme as a black box) are competitive, as well. Krawczyk's scheme [Kra00] is based on generating all of the certificates in advance in a pseudorandom manner. The most recent work by Malkin, Micciancio and Miner [MMM02] modifies the tree-based scheme of Bellare and Miner to achieve greater efficiency and remove the requirement (present in all prior schemes) that the number of time periods be fixed in advance, prior to Key Generation. These schemes are difficult to compare directly with schemes in the first category, because they depend heavily on how the ordinary signature scheme is instantiated. They can outperform schemes in the first category in some (but not all) parameters.
Our contribution
Our forward-secure digital signature scheme significantly improves the speed of Key Update algorithm: it becomes just a single modular squaring of the secret key, which is faster than in all previously known schemes. We therefore call our scheme KREUS for "Kozlov-Reyzin Efficient Update Signatures." Our Signing and Verifying algorithms, although slower than those of some other previous schemes, are also reasonably efficient. In particular, the on-line component of Signing (i.e., the part of the signing algorithm that can be performed only once the message is known) is extremely efficient, requiring less than a single multiplication.
Our key and signature sizes are small, and no extra storage is required. Similarly in spirit (and in technique) to [IR01] , at the cost of storing log T extra values and increasing the Update time to log T modular squarings (this still more efficient than all prior schemes), we can improve the speed of the off-line component of Signing, as further detailed in Section 4. This is a surprising and novel application of the techniques of Jakobsson [Jak02] and Coppersmith and Jakobsson [CJ02] for traversing hash sequences.
Our construction was inspired by the work of Song in the area of forward-secure Group Signature schemes [Son01] , that in turn is based on the ordinary Group Signature scheme by Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye, and Tsudik [ACJT00]. Since we do not need many features pertinent to group signatures (such as coalition resistance, anonymity, backward unlinkability, traceability, etc.), our scheme is more concise and simpler to implement. All we rely on is the proof of knowledge of Discrete Logarithm in a group of unknown size initially proposed by Fujisaki and Okamoto in [FO97] .
We note that both our scheme and the scheme of [AR00] rely on the signer knowing some iterated square root of the public key. The scheme of [AR00] is much less efficient, however, because the signer needs to know a root of a much higher degree. We can use lower-degree roots because we use a different technique for proving knowledge of a square root, as further detailed in Section 3.
Definitions
Forward-secure digital signature schemes
The definitions of forward security are taken almost verbatim from [AR00] , which in turn follows very closely the definitions of [BM99] .
A forward-secure digital signature scheme is, first of all, a key-evolving digital signature scheme. A key-evolving signature scheme is very similar to a standard one. Like a standard signature scheme, it has Key Generation, Signing and Verification algorithms. The public key is left unchanged throughout the lifetime of the scheme, making the Verification algorithm very similar to that of a standard signature scheme. Unlike a standard signature scheme, a key-evolving signature scheme has its operation divided into time periods, each of which uses a different (but related) secret key to sign messages. The way these keys are updated is given by a public Key Update algorithm, which computes the secret key for the new time period based on that for the previous time period. The forward security comes, in part, from the fact that this Key Update function is one-way and, given the secret key for the current period, it is hard to compute any of the previously used secret keys. Let us now define more formally what a key-evolving digital signature scheme is and then define what it means for it to be forward-secure.
Definition 1 (Key-evolving signature scheme). A key-evolving digital signature scheme is a quadruple of algorithms, F SIG = (FSIG.key, FSIG.update, FSIG.sign, FSIG.verify), where:
• FSIG.key, the Key Generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N (given in unary as 1 k ) and the total number of periods T and returns a pair (SK 1 , P K), the initial secret key and the public key;
• FSIG.sign, the (possibly probabilistic) Signing algorithm, takes as input the secret key SK j for the current time period j and the message M to be signed and returns a pair j, sign , the signature of M for time period j;
• FSIG.update, the (possibly probabilistic) Secret Key Update algorithm, takes as input the secret key for the current period SK j and returns the new secret key SK j+1 for the next period;
• FSIG.verify, the (deterministic) Verification algorithm, takes as input the public key P K, a message M , and a candidate signature j, sign , and returns 1 if j, sign is a valid signature of M or 0, otherwise. We require FSIG.verify P K (M, FSIG.sign SK j (M )) = 1 for every message M and time period j.
We also assume that the secret key SK j for time period j ≤ T always contains both the value j itself and the value T of the total number of periods. Finally, we adopt the convention that SK T +1 is the empty string and that FSIG.update SK T returns SK T +1 . Since we are going to work in the random oracle model [BR93] , all the above-mentioned algorithms would additionally have oracle access to a public hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l for some security parameter l that is known to all the algorithms. The function H is assumed to be random in the security analysis.
Having defined a key-evolving signature scheme, we now define what it means for such a scheme to be forward-secure. We concern ourselves here with security only in the random oracle model, because this model is required for our scheme.
To define security, we need to specify the adversary. Besides knowing the user's public key P K, the adversary also gets to know the total number of time periods T and the current time period j. The adversary runs in three phases (it is allowed to preserve state information between phases). In the first phase, the chosen message attack phase (cma), the adversary has access to a signing oracle, which it can query to obtain signatures of messages of its choice with respect to the current secret key; we designate by q sig the total number of signature queries. The adversary can also make queries to the random oracle H at any time; we designate by q hash the total number of H-queries. At the end of each time period, the adversary can choose whether to stay in the same phase or switch to the break-in phase (breakin). In the break-in phase, which models the possibility of a key exposure, we give the adversary the secret key SK j for the specific time period j it decided to break in. In the last phase, the forgery phase (forge), the adversary outputs a signaturemessage pair, that is, a forgery. The adversary is considered to be successful if it forges a signature of some new message (that is, not previously queried to the signing oracle) for some time period prior to j. In order to capture the notion of forward security of a key-evolving signature scheme FSIG = (FSIG.key, FSIG.update, FSIG.sign, FSIG.verify) more formally, let F be an adversary for this scheme. To assess the success probability of F breaking the forward security of FSIG, consider the following experiment: Finally, to define security, let FSIG = (FSIG.key, FSIG.update, FSIG.sign, FSIG.verify) be a key-evolving signature scheme, H be a random oracle and F be an adversary as described above. We now define
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries F making a total of at most q sig queries to the signing oracle across all the stages and for which the running time of the above experiment is at most t and at most q hash queries are made to the random oracle H. The smaller the insecurity function, the more forward-secure the scheme is. To obtain an asymptotic definition of security, one would polynomially relate k, l, and T to a single security parameter, and define the scheme to be forward-secure if the insecurity function is negligible in the security parameter.
Strong-RSA Assumption
We use essentially the same Strong-RSA assumption as [IR01] , and hence quote it from there almost verbatim.
The assumption was first introduced independently in [BP97] and [FO97] , and postulates that it is hard to compute any root of a fixed value modulo a composite integer. More precisely, the Strong-RSA assumption states that it is intractable, given n that is a product of two primes and a value α in Z * n , to find β ∈ Z * n and r > 1 such that β r ≡ α (mod n). Just like [IR01] , we modify the assumption in two ways. First, we restrict ourselves to the moduli that are products of so-called "safe" primes (a safe prime is one of the form 2q + 1, where q itself is a prime). Note that, assuming safe primes are frequent, this restriction does not strengthen the assumption. Second, we upperbound the permissible values or r by 2 l , where l is a security parameter for our scheme (in an implementation, l will be significantly shorter than the length k of the modulus n; the sole difference between our assumption and the one in [IR01] is that [IR01] upperbound r by 2 l+1 instead of 2 l ). More formally, let A be an algorithm. Consider the following experiment.
Randomly choose two primes q 1 and q 2 of length ⌈k/2⌉ − 1 each such that 2q 1 + 1 and 2q 2 + 1 are both prime.
be the maximum of Succ(k, l, A) over all the adversaries A who run in time at most t. Our assumption is that InSec SRSA (k, l, t), for some t polynomial in k, is negligible in k. The smaller the value of l, of course, the weaker the assumption.
In fact, for a sufficiently small l, our assumption follows from a variant of the fixed-exponent RSA assumption. Namely, assume that there exists a constant ǫ such that, for every r, the probability of computing, in time t, an r-th root of a random integer modulo a k-bit product of two safe primes, is at most 2
3 The New Scheme
Background
Our construction relies on proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms in groups of hidden order [FO97] , which are recalled in this section. We first recall the well-known construction due to Schnorr [Sch91] for a group of known order. Let p be a safe prime (i.e. p = 2q + 1, q -also prime) and let g be a generator of QR p , the group of quadratic residues modulo p of size |QR p | = p−1 2 = q. Let the public key be P K = (y, g, p), and the secret key be SK = (x, g, p). We give P K to the verifier and SK to the prover. The following protocol allows the prover to convince the verifier that the prover knows x ≡ log g y (mod p). Let l be a security parameter; the knowledge error (informally, the probability of prover cheating), as defined in [BG92] , will be 2 −l .
This protocol is both honest-verifier zero-knowledge and a proof of knowledge. Hence, it makes an identification scheme secure against passive attacks, and therefore can be transformed into a signature scheme secure against chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model using the 
. Although the use of the order q of the group seems crucial in the above protocol, it turns out not to be needed, as shown in [FO97] (see section 4.1 of [CM98] for a more accessible write-up). Specifically, instead of working modulo a safe prime p, we will work modulo a composite n = p 1 p 2 , where both p 1 and p 2 are safe primes (i.e. p i = 2q i + 1, where q i are also primes for i = 1, 2). It is easy to see that the group QR n of quadratic residues modulo n has size |QR n | = = q 1 q 2 and is cyclic (by Chinese Remainder Theorem, because QR p 1 and QR p 2 are both cyclic). Let g be a generator of QR n (Chinese Remainder theorem implies that a random element of QR n is very likely to be a generator, unless it is congruent to 1 modulo p 1 or p 2 ). We will now work in QR n , instead of QR p , and will not require the prover or the verifier to know the factorization of n or, equivalently, the order of QR n .
As in the previous case, y = g x mod n, P K = (y, g, n) and SK = (x, g, n) . Let k = |n| be length of n in bits, and ǫ > 1 be another security parameter (the amount of information leaked by the signer, or, more formally, exact statistical zero-knowledgeness, will be roughly 2 −(l+k)(ǫ−1) ). The reasonable parameter values are k = 1024, l = 160, ǫ = 1.07 (see [CM98] for an analysis of statistical zero-knowledgeness of this protocol, from which the value for ǫ follows).
Note that the main difference from the previous protocol is that s is not computed modulo the group size, but rather as an integer. Note also that the set from which t is selected somewhat larger than before, to provide statistical zero-knowledgeness.
This protocol is a secure identification scheme under the Strong-RSA assumption; hence, like the previous protocol, it can be converted to a signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir transform.
Our Forward-Secure Scheme
Our scheme relies essentially only on the above protocol, and on the fact that squaring in QR n is a one-way permutation. Specifically, the public key contains a modulus n as above, and a value v ∈ QR n . The secret key for time period j contains the root c j ∈ QR n of 1/v of degree 2 T −j+1 . Hence, Key Update is just squaring: c j+1 ← c 2 j mod n. To sign messages in time period j, the signer applies the Fiat-Shamir transform to the interactive proof of knowledge of c j . So all that remains is to show how to construct a proof of knowledge of 2 T −j+1 -th root of 1/v modulo n. [Son01] . Let y be a generator of QR n (included in both the public and the secret keys). The prover "blinds" c j by a random power of y: A ← c j y w mod n for a random w. Using the protocol from the previous section, the prover then proves knowledge of the discrete logarithm of vA 2 T −j+1 to the base y 2 T −j+1 . Completeness follows from the fact that prover knows w, which is the required discrete logarithm:
Proof of knowledge property follows from the fact that knowledge of such A and w is equivalent to knowledge of a root of 1/v of degree 2 T −j+1 , which can simply be computed as A/y w from the previous equation. Note that the verifier has to check that A is not 0 modulo n, because the proof for discrete logarithms is not sound in that case.
There is a minor concern: namely, because the prover does not know the order of the group QR n , how can the prover select w so that y w is a uniformly selected random element of QR n ? We address it by relaxing the requirement from perfect uniformity to "statistical uniformity." Namely, we use (n − 1)/4 as a good approximation to |QR n | = φ(n)/4, and simply select w as an integer between 0 and (n − 1)/4. Note that the chances that w > |QR n | are
, and hence are negligible.
The resulting identification protocol is as follows. In the above protocol, the prover needs to compute A only once to blind c j ; using the same A multiple times does not hurt security of this scheme. The value y 2 T −j+1 also need be computed only once, and can be saved and reused by the prover. In addition, the value d can be computed off-line, before the protocol starts. Only s has to be computed on-line.
If the verifier interacts with the same prover multiple times in time period j, the verifier can also save and reuse y 2 T −j+1 and A 2 T −j+1 . The conversion from this identification scheme to the signature scheme is straightforward [FS86, AABN02] , using a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , for a security parameter l. See Figure 1 for the resulting KREUS forward-secure signature scheme.
Performance
Improving Signer Costs via Pebbling
Note that the signer has to compute, in time period j, the valueỹ = y 2 T −j+1 mod n. In other words, the signer needs to compute, in order, the values y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y T , where y T = y and y j−1 = y 2 j mod n. Note that this would be easy if the order of the values was reverse: the signer could just square the previous value each time. The direction we need is harder. This is exactly the problem that Jakobsson [Jak02] and Coppersmith and Jakobsson [CJ02] address, except that they consider any one-way (hash) function, whereas we are interested specifically in modular squaring. They show that one can traverse a one-way chain by storing a few of its elements and performing a few computations per step. Specifically, the simple algorithm of [Jak02] requires ⌈log 2 T ⌉ values stored and ⌈log 2 T ⌉ steps in each time period; the much more complex one of [CJ02] requires about log 2 T + log 2 log 2 T values stored and further reduces the computation cost to about 0.5 log 2 T . Both algorithms use "pebbling" techniques, similar in spirit to those of [IR01] .
In Figure 2 , we present, in detail, a simple self-contained implementation of the algorithm of [Jak02] for use with our signature scheme. It is an adaptation to the pebbling algorithm of Jakobsson of the implementation given in [IR02] . While this description suffices to implement the algorithm, we refer the reader interested in the intuition to [Jak02] . 
mod n y R ← QR n // One may check that y is a generator of QR(n), but this is not necessary, since it will hold with overwhelming probability of 1 − q1+q2−1 q1q2
// SK j is the secret key for time period j = 1, 2, ..., T Parse SK j as (j, n, T, c j , y) if j = T then return nil // note that nil here denotes the empty string else c j+1 ← (c j ) 2 mod n;
// M is the message; SK j is the secret key for time period j; and k, l and ǫ are the security parameters Parse SK j as (j, n, T, c j , y) Once Per Time Period: w
// M is the message, P K is the public key, and (s, σ, j, A) is the purported signature for time period j Parse P K as (n, T, v, y) Once Per Time Period Per Signer:Ã ← A 2 T −j+1 mod n;ỹ ← y 2 T −j+1 mod n For Each Signature:
′ , M ) and A ≡ 0 (mod n) then return 1 else return 0 define data structure Pebble = {ỹ, pos, rb, re} //ỹ is the value to be used in time period pos (in each pebbleỹ = y 2 T −pos+1 ); // pos stands for position, "r" for "responsibility," "b" for "begin" and "e" for "end"
TR ← 1; while TR < T do TR ← 2 · TR // Let TR be the smallest power of 2 greater than T let Pebble P ← {y 2 , T, 1, TR}; L ← a list of Pebbles (initially, just the single element P ) for i ← −(T − 4)/2 to 1 (inclusive) do // initialize by reaching position 1 PebbleRound(L, i) remove the first element of L; itsỹ value is y 2 T and is to be used in the first time period
In KeyUpdate at the end of time period j add: PebbleRound(L, j + 1) remove the first element of L; itsỹ value is y 2 T −j to be used in time period j + 1
Compute how much to move (it will be at most 2
Procedure MoveLeft(P ) while P.pos ≤ P.re do // Can't move until pos > re, or else won't be able to reach re // Spawn a new pebble and delegate upper half of responsibility to it mid ← ⌊(P.rb + P.re)/2⌋+1 if mid ≤ T then // The new pebble is needed only if it is for a "real" time period, T or before let Pebble P 1 ← (P.ỹ, P.pos, mid , P.re); insert P 1 into L immediately following P P.re ← mid − 1 P.ỹ ← P.ỹ 2 mod n; P.pos ← P.pos − 1 // this is the actual move left Thus, in our scheme, much like in the scheme of [IR01] , a time/memory tradeoff is possible: if the signer stores log 2 T values, then the cost per time period goes down from linear in T to logarithmic in T . Note, however, that both in our scheme and in [IR01] , if the signer does not use pebbling, then the linear in T cost needs to be incurred only in those time periods in which signatures are issued; whereas if pebbling is used, then the logarithmic in T cost needs to be incurred in every time period in order for the pebbling algorithm to work correctly.
Performance Comparison
In Tables 1 and 2 we compare the performance of our scheme to the performance of other FiatShamir-like forward-secure signature schemes of [BM99] , [AR00] and [IR01] . The comparison is in Update Off-line Signing per On-line time period message Signing
3l/2 3l(T − j)/2 3l/2 3l/2 with k log 2 T storage (3l/2) log 2 T 0 3l/2 3l/2 KREUS 1 T − j + 3k/2 3ǫ(l + k)/2 1 with k log 2 T storage log 2 T 3k/2 3ǫ(l + k)/2 1 n/a terms of the number of modular multiplications required, expressed as functions of the total number of time periods T , the key size k, the hash length l, security parameter ǫ, and a current time period j. We assume that a modular exponentiation with an l-bit exponent is roughly equal to 3l/2 modular multiplications; to improve readability, we ignore small additive constants. The "generic" schemes of [BM99] , [Kra00] and [MMM02] are not included in our comparison because of their fundamentally different design (their performance depends on the ordinary signature scheme with which they are instantiated). Table 1 contains three metrics corresponding to Key Update, off-line Signing and on-line Signing parts of each scheme. Off-line Signing is additionally subdivided into two components: off-line Signing per time period and off-line Signing per message. By "off-line Signing per time period" we mean the computations that are needed only once per time period, and only in those time periods in which signatures are issued. This is different from Key Update, which needs to be performed in every time period, whether or not signatures are issued. This distinction-between off-line Signing per time period and Key Update-has not been made before. In particular, while the authors of [IR01] state that their scheme has a high update cost, in our terms it has a high off-line signing per time period cost. This distinction is important: if time periods are short for added security, then it is quite possible that no signatures will be issued in many of the time periods (and hence much of the computation will not be necessary). Table 2 presents verifier's costs, subdivided into the costs the verifier incurs only once per time period (for a given signer), and the costs for each signature.
We evaluate the expressions in Table 1 for specific practical parameter values in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 considers T = 512 (more than one update per day for a year), and Table 4 considers T = 2 25 (more than one update per second for a year).
Finally, these tables allows us to determine when our scheme has lower total signer costs than [IR01] for the above parameter values of k, l, ǫ, both with and without the extra storage. We obtain the following results: without the extra storage, our scheme has lower total signer costs if no more Table 4 : Performance of different schemes (in modular multiplications) with T = 2 25 , k = 1024, l = 160, j = T /2, ǫ = 1.07 that 42 signatures per time period are issued for T = 512, and if no more that 2.8 million signatures per time period are issued for T = 2 25 . With the extra storage, the relative performance of [IR01] improves, and our scheme's total signer costs are lower if no more than 0.7 signatures per time period are issued for T = 512, and no more than 3 signatures per time period are issued for T = 2 25 .
Security
The security proof is fairly standard: one can use the forking lemma technique of [PS96] and/or the reduction from identification to signatures of [AABN02] . We omit it here for lack of space; we do, however, point out its most salient features. The security proof boils down to running the forger and simulating answers to the forger's signature queries. For this simulation, one relies on the statistical zero-knowledgeness of the identification scheme, using techniques similar to the ones of [CM98] . After a successful simulation, one obtains from the forger two signatures (s, σ, j, A) and (s ′ , σ ′ , j, A) for the same d. In other words, We now consider two types of forgers. In the first type,σ dividess. To violate the Strong-RSA assumption using such forger, the reduction, on input a random α ∈ Z
